380 addition, to follow a simple two-state Markov process, then a significant fraction of the resulting equilibria suffer from extraneous uncertainty. We give some examples of self-fulfilling prophecies that correspond to a permanent "recession" and permanent "boom" in an economy entirely free from price rigidities. This phenomenon appears to be robust to changes in preferences and in the store of value: it will exist, for instance, under a gross substitutes assumption or a replacement of fiat money with unconditional claims on productive assets. The effect of extraneous uncertainty disappears, however, when the horizon is truncated; in the stationary state this may occur as well if enough contingent claims markets are appended to the economy.
I. PERFECT FORESIGHT
The most convenient way to introduce the basic structure and fix notation is to review the dynamics of the perfect foresight case. We begin with the simplest possible overlapping-generations mode12: Time extends from zero to infinity; at the beginning of each time period t = 1,2,..., a fixed-size generation of identical individuals is born which lives for two periods, youth and old age. Consumption occurs only in old age, production takes place solely in youth. The very first generation, born at t = 0, is "old": each member of it is endowed with one unit of fiat money. Each member of the generation currently young may use a constant-returns-to-scale technology to transform n units of his own leisure into y < n units of a perishable good for which he has no immediate use. The young, endowed with one unit of divisible leisure each, are obviously motivated to trade goods for the fiat store of value which is held exclusively by the old.
For each generation, preferences over current work and future consumption are additive, viz., v,(ct+ 1) %I = e,+ 1) -&A
where u(.) and -g(+) are smooth monotone, concave functions. Let pr, yt be the price level and goods supply per young person in period t. The pair of sequences { pT }F { yf )r is an equilibrium, if:
(a) For each t > 1, y,* is indeed equal to the amount of goods supplied by each young person, given the price-level sequence {p:};. In other words, yT maximizes {u(c,+ i) -g(y,)} s.t. c,, , =pTy,/pF+, and 0 < y, < I; (b) the initial condition y,* is feasible, i.e., lies in the interval [0, I]; and * More general treatments appear in [ 10. 11, 51 . Readers familiar with this literature may skim Section I to pick up the notation.
(c) the demand for nominal money balances per head equals the corresponding supply, i.e., p:y:" = 1 for all t.
We begin our examination of perfect foresight dynamics quite informally. Let us define s(p,/p,+r) as the solution to the maximum problem in (a) above, i.e., as the apount of goods supplied by each young person in period t if current price is pt and future price is pI+ 1. Clearly s(.) is a single-valued function about which we cannot say much unless we are willing to restrict preferences somewhat. For instance, s(e) is monotone increasing (decreasing) if current leisure and future consumption are gross substitutes (gross complements) at all values of the price ratio pi/p,+, .
The market clears if the price sequence {p,}? satisfies S(Pt/Pt+ 1) = l/P,* (14 This first-order difference equation, together with the price level p. in period zero, describes the evolution of equilibrium prices over time. Equation (la) clearly reveals that the production economy we are studying in this paper is very close to the simple pure exchange economy frequently studied in the overlapping-generations literature. Suppose, for instance, that each member of generations t = 1,2,..., were endowed not with leisure but with positive amounts (e,, eJ of a perishable consumption good in youth and old age. Given this endowment vector, let s( pt/pt+ 1) be now what the young save at the price ratio pI/pt+, and assume that s(pt/pt+ ,) > 0, for all values of pt/pt+ r, The dynamics of this exchange model is again given by Eq. (la).
Returning to our production economy, we define a stationary equilibrium price sequence as any non-negative constant sequence { p*}F satisfying Eq. (la). Clearly, pt = co for all t is one such sequence and it supports an autarkic equilibrium with zero output and worthless money.
There is exactly one other stationary equilibrium price sequence with valuable money, i.e., such that p* < co. This one is defined from
it is unique because s(a) is single-valued, i.e., only one value of goods supply corresponds to the maximal element of the budget set { yt, c(+ r ( 0 < c,,, GY,l* The stability of this particular stationary state depends very much on preferences. Suppose, for instance, that consumption and leisure are gross substitutes and let pt > p* for some t. Then l/p, < l/p*, and equilibrium requires that s(p,/p,+,) < s(l). Since s(a) is increasing, we have pI/pl+, < 1 or pt+ r > pr, thus moving further away from p *. Gross substitutability in our simple perfect-forsight economy implies that the stationary state with finite price level is unstable.
More formally, if we define two functions
such that G(n) --) 0 as n -+ 0, assume that G(n) + co as n -+ 1, and solve the maximum problem in part (a) of the previous definition, we find that every equilibrium sequence satisfies three requirements: the initial condition y,, = y,X; feasibility, i.e., y, E [0, 11; and a "law of motion," viz.,
We note that, in equilibrium, y, equals the commodity price of money in period t; Eq. (3) is merely Eq. (la) with preferences made explicit.
For stationary equilibria, Eq. (3) becomes U(y**) = G(y**).
It is well known [ 2, I3 ] that these three requirements are not sufficient to determine the price level, pt (equivalently, the commodity price of money) unless we know the initial price y0 = I/p,. To each value of y0 there corresponds typically a different equilibrium sequence ( y:}?. To see this we graph Eq. (3) in Fig. 1 and confirm readily that there exist two steady states: one corresponding to zero price of money (at the origin), another to a positive price (at y**). In panel III, for example, the stationary state S with positive price of money is stable and may be, reached in infinite time from any y0 E (0, 1). Hence, there is an infinity of equilibrium price sequences.
Initial conditions are, of course, arbitrary; our model provides the economy with no mechanism to choose among them, leaving the equilibrium price sequence indeterminate. Even if we somehow confined our attention to equilibria which are not Pareto-dominated by other equilibria,3 it is not obvious that we would be left with a unique solution since many of these multiple equilibria turn out to be Pareto-noncomparable.
An illustration of this dilemma is in panel IV of Fig. 1 , which corresponds to preferences g(n) = n/k*, u(c) = --c-l for some constant k E (0, I). Then G(n) = n/k*, U(c) = l/c, and (3) yields Y,, 1 Y, = kZ. (4) ' The suggestion is discussed in [ 13. 11. %+l (3) 45
The non-trivial stationary solution is y ** = k but there are others for which the economy cycles, e.g.,
for any constant a E [k*, 11. The non-trivial stationary solution yields utility -2/k for each generation whereas the cycling solution yields (-2a/k*, -2/a) to successive generations. For a # k, one sees easily that
and, hence, (5) cannot be compared with y** = k. To sum up: The non-uniqueness of the equilibrium price level in the overlapping generations model is a phenomenon which owes much to the infinite number of decision makers and dated commodities, and very little to properties like lack of gross substitutability which are crucial in a static general equilibrium contexL4
What is less well understood is that extraneous uncertainty considerably enlarges the set of equilibrium prices that arise under perfect foresight, by adding in certain cases an infinity of self-replicating equilibria. Some of these are examined next.
II. REPLICATING EQUILIBRIA
We can now introduce extraneous uncertainty at little cost in additional notation. Denote by ~2, the information set available to agents .in period t; this may include any historical element in the economy such as prices and quantities. Let wI be a typical element of Q,. By analogy with the preceding section, a pair of sequences of random variables {J'Y*}F {Y;}? is an equilibrium if: At the individual level, the probability distribution of Y; is derived from that of JIM and both are conditional on Q,. In the aggregate, the "law of motion" for the economy becomes
the solution being again an appropriate conditional probability distribution which confirms price expectations. This law, however, does not constrain sufficiently the solution for it says nothing whatever about the higher moments of the random variable U(y,+ ,). Suppose, for example, that cl is any independent, identically distributed random variable with mean one, belonging to the information set Q,; then the stochastic difference equation
"solves" Eq. (7) and corresponds to a rational expectations equilibrium if, given yt, et+, is defined so that y,, , E [0, l] with probability 1 for all t.
To avoid problems with feasibility and, at the same time, restrict somewhat the equilibrium price set, we limit ourselves to solutions with the Markov property, i.e., ones for which Q,=Y*. (9) In particular, suppose that, for all t, the price of money may attain at most two values, yf = { y, , yZ}, with the following stationary transition probability matrix:
For those who like to think of price randomness as a "structural" phenomenon, this matrix simply reflects the stochastic properties of any variable deemed by public opinion to have a bearing on economic activity. Since there is myriad of such candidate variables, it makes some sense to treat the probabilities (q, , q2) as parameters in this economy-just as we do with prices.
A sev-fulfilling equilibrium is now a set of four numbers (ql, q2, y, , yJ all lying in the interval (0, l] and satisfying Eq. (7), viz. Since these are two equations in four unknowns5 we should generally expect multiple equilibria. Some of them we already know: if the economy has a stationary state y** under perfect foresight, that is, a solution to G(y)= U(y), then every quadruple (ql, q2, y**, y**) such that q1 E [0, I] and q2 E 10, 1 ] obviously solves (1 la)-(1 lb) and is an equilibrium. Extraneous uncertainty, of course, involves dr$Fzrent prices of money in the two states.
There are at least two special assumptions that will exclude extraneous uncertainty in this self-replicating example, The more obvious one is that consumption and leisure are gross substitutes, that is, U is an increasing function of y. Then, under perfect foresight, we recall that no equilibrium price sequence goes to the non-trivial stationary state unless it started there (see also Fig. 1, panel I) . A similar problem appears under uncertainty: goods supply is increasing in the price level, a fact which is not consistent with market clearing, i.e., with Then one easiiy verifies that q1 + q2 < 1. Similarly, with y, < y,, the q's are probabilities with sum no more than one if, and only if,
The equations G(y,) = U( y2) and U(y,) = G(y2) are clearly symmetric in the plane around the straight line y, = y,. In Fig. 2 , then, inequalities (14a, b) are satisfied by all points lying simultaneously not below the line U( yJ = G(y,), not above the line U(y,) = G(y2) and above the 45" line; similarly, inequalities (14c, d) are satisfied by all points not above the line U(y,) = G( yl), not below U( y,) = G(y,) and below the 45' line. The set of points that satisfies all four inequalities (14a)-( 14d) is shaded in Fig. 2 . No equilibrium with extraneous uncertainty exists in panel I but there is an infinity of them in panel II. What is more important, the shaded area has significant size (i.e., is not a set of measure zero) relative to the set of all feasible allocations when q, and q2 are both positive. Otherwise, some of the relations in (14) become strict equalities, the shaded area collapses to one of 'J(y,) =G$) FIGURE 2 its boundaries, and the set of equilibria with extraneous uncertainty has measure zero.
A sufficient condition for panel II to obtain is obviously that the line U( y,) = G( uz) be steeper than the line U( yz) = G( y ,) at point S, or G'(y**)/U'(y**) + 1 > 0,
I.e., that the "law of motion" in Eq. (3) yield a locally stable nontrivial stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight case. Panel III in Fig. 2 shows that this condition is not necessary; it is violated at S, and yet extraneous uncertainty appears in the shaded areas near the NW and SE corners. In summary, if q1 + q2 ( 1, a set of sufficient (but not necessary) conditions that guarantee the existence of replicating equilibria with extraneous uncertainty under the stochastic structure postulated in (10) are: gross complementarity between consumption and leisure, and local stability of the non-trivial stationary state. Furthermore, if the transition probability matrix is ergodic, then the set of these equilibria has the same dimension as that of all feasible allocations.
III. ARE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES LIKELY?
Readers who, for intuitive reasons of their own, remain unconvinced of the importance of self-fulfilling prophecies may regard the example in the preceding section as an artifact of the imagination that is unlikely to occur in "practice."
Yet, under the assumptions made in the previous paragraph, extraneous uncertainty is not only possible but "probable" as well; for most configurations of the exogenous probabilities, q1 and q2 such that q, + q2 < 1, there exists one stationary equilibrium and at least cwo other distinct equilibria such that y, # y,. To see this, suppose g'(1) = co, U(c) 
Here the function g(q), defined as the solution to g'(y) = qu'(y), is obviously increasing, because of the gross complements assumption, and such that y^( 1) = y**.
From the information in (lBa, b, c) we may now draw Eqs. (17a, b) in Fig. 3 . By the local stability of the stationary equilibriam, the line U(y,) = f(q2, y2) is steeper than U(y,) = p(ql, y,) at point S. Hence, to each pair (ql, q2) of probabilities such that q1 # q2 corresponds the nontrivial stationary solution y* * and, in addition, at least two distinct equilibria with extraneous uncertainty: one at E, in which y1 < y** < y,, another at E, such that y, < y** < y,. When q1 = q2, points E, and E, become symmetric about the 45" line and we have a single equilibrium other than S.
As (ql, q2) takes on valuess in the set [0, 1 ] X [0, 11, i.e., in the square area of Fig. 4 , the two lines in Fig. 3 change position, their intersections yielding the set of all equilibrium prices of money. The shaded area in Fig. 4 corresponds to (ql, q2) values for which the stationary value y** is the only equilibrium with positive price of money. Extraneous uncertainty will appear for (ql, q2) in the unshaded region and, outside the set of measure zero terize at least two-thirds of the equilibria in that region. In fact, if there are many intersections in Fig. 3 other than E,, S, E,, then nearly all the equilibria which correspond to the unshaded area of Fig. 4 will suffer from extraneous uncertainty. Averaging the two regions of that figure, then, it is clear in this example that self-fulfilling prophecies are at least "one-third" and less than "one-half' of all equilibria.
IV. PERMANENT RECESSIONS
The Markovian structure of the matrix T links the economy's present with its immediate past; in fact, it is fairly straightforward to verify by tedious computation that q1 + q2 < 1 implies a negative serial correlation in equilibrium output. To ascertain what the economy does over the long haul, one typically considers T, the nth power of the matrix T; if T is ergodic, then as n --P co, LV' tends to some matrix' are steady-state probabilities that the economy will, in infinite time, find itself in states 1 or 2, irrespective of initial conditions. The ratio of these probabilities, ~,/% = (1 -q*)l(l -41h (18) may attain values arbitrarily close to zero if q2 = 1 -2s, q1 = E and E is a positive number sufficiently close to zero. Then the economy will either be in the stationary state or "settle" asymptotically on state 2, that is, on a nearly permanent, extreme level of economic activity-recessionary or boomlike. Since we do not know how a particular equilibrium prevails when several are possible, we cannot be sure that, in some circumstances at least, an extreme equilibrium will obtain. But it is interesting to note that a nearly "permanent" low level of economic activity is consistent with a neoclassical model of equilibrium in which prices are flexible and expectations are rational.
V. ROBUSTNESS
We consider briefly here whether perturbations of the assumptions we employed in the extended example of Sections II-IV will alter the basic message, which is that infinitely many solutions exist with the extraneous uncertainty property.
(a) Gross Complementarity
Suppose that consumption and leisure are, instead, gross substitutes. In particular let u(c) = c and g(n) = n2 for n E 10, l] so that the law of motion in Eq. (7) In other words, starting from any point in (0, l/2], the economy will reach y** = l/2 with positive probability, an event which panel I in Fig. 1 shows to be impossible under perfect foresight.
(b) The Role of Fiat Money
Can we blame the inherent worthlessness of fiat money for the great multiplicity oif equilibria which are consistent with self-fulfilling prophecies? If a productive asset like land were the sole store of value,8 then we know from Calvo [2, Sect, I] that an infinity of equilibrium price sequences are possible under perfect foresight, and we may guess that the situation does not change drastically if one injects prophecies into the economy.
This suspicion is borne out in the following model. Preferences are as in Eq. (1) and there is no money; land is transferred from the old to the young at the beginning of each period in return for consumption goods later in that period. Let N denote hours of work; Q = amount of land; output is Y = F(Q, N) where F is smooth, concave, with constant returns-to-scale. Also, define y 5 Y/Q; rz = N/Q; f(z) = F(1, z); p = price of land (including rental) in terms of current consumption. Endowments are fl= 1 for leisure and o= 1 for land. All variables are per member of the young generation, except p which applies to each member of the old generation.
To purchase one unit of land in period t, the young must work in return n, = h(p,) hours, where h =f-' is the inverse production (e.g., labor requirements) function. Each unit of land will entitle the owner to consume P t+ 1 units of output in old age; to entertain the possibility of self-fulfilling prophesis we allow p,+, to be stochastic in principle.
The young demand QT units of land, which is the solution to Fig. 2 ) to pick equilibrium prices of money close enough to the stationary state so that the real rate of return on money always exceeds -h. and goes through the same process as in the beginning of Section II, one finds that every interior rational expectations equilibrium satisfies (23) This first-order difference equation is very similar to the one in Eq. (7), permitting again infinitely many stochastic equilibria.
I conclude that it is not fiat money in itself that sustains self-fulfilling prophecies in the economy at hand.
VI. THE ORIGIN OF EXTRANEOUS UNCERTAINTY
To isolate the factors responsible for self-perpetuating prophecies let us examine two changes in the basic model of Section II which are sufficient to do away with the influence of extraneous uncertainty. The first one is an announcement by some authority at t = 0 that exchange in period T > 0 will be permitted to occur only at some deterministic price pT (or even at a random price fir, provided that is uncorrelated with pT-,). Then, uncertainty unravels, for Eq. (7) says that, for t < T, all equilibrium prices will be deterministic.
By truncating the time horizon, this form of price controls yields finitely many decision makers and steers clear of the large equilibrium price sets which typically arise otherwise.' Like many types of price controls, this one assumes the authorities know a lot: given T and the initial condition p,,, the price pT will support an equilibrium only if (po, pT) are consistent with the law of motion WP;') = W~P;,',) I PII with p;' = l/p,, 124)
that is, only if authorities have exact knowledge of the dynamic behavior of the economy. A more important cause of self-fulfilling prophecies seems to be the shortage of claims markets. If the predictions of the Cumaean Sibyl affect allocations in Rome, can the Romans neutralize her interference by building up their financial system and, in particular, by storing value in claims which deliver consumption contingent on what the Sibyl says?
Let qij be the (stationary) probability that the future state will be j if the current state is i (i,j = 1, 2); 7rj = money price of a claim delivering one unit of consumption in statej; zij = number of claims on statej bought by the old if the past state is i; wii = number of claims sold by young. Money serves no 9See 18, pp. 111-112; 111.
function anymore, but it is useful to continue thinking of it as a medium of exchange and pretend that each old person has one unit of it. The old choose zij by maximizing expected utility of consumption, i.e., solving max 4il u(zil) + 4i*"(zi2) Sat* Zil 2 0, Zi* > 0; 7zIZil + 71*Zi* < 1; i = 1, 2.
The young on the other hand, minimize the expected disutility of work needed to acquire any given money revenue, A, from the sale of claims. Thus the wij solve Call zj" the common value of zfi, zi2, * . then, as A = 1 for every young person in every state, we have (?r1+rr2)z~=(rr,+rr2)z~=1(+)z~=z~. Consumption (more generally, economic activity) has become entirely independent of the state of nature. The Sibyl of Cumae now stands thoroughly neutralized; but the vast Roman Empire is blessed with eight more Sibyls, a large number of oracles, religious seers and mystery cults. To render all of them ineffectual requires more claims markets than the Romans can reasonably hope to set up.
Even if we suppose momentarily that all requisite markets were costlessly avilable and open for business, there is no guarantee that they would rob the Sibyl of all power to influence economic events. The present section demonstrates this to occur in a special case, that is, when preferences are additive, beliefs are homogeneous and the probability distribution of future prices conditioned on current prices is stationary.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The central message of this paper is that even perfectly well-behaved economies will typically admit rational expectations equilibria in which the expectations themselves spark fluctuations in the level of business activity. If many individuals naively believe that sunspots" or some index of confidence are good predictors of future prices, then they may take actions which tend to bear out their beliefs.
Self-fulfilling prophecies are by their very nature a source of indeterminacy, augmenting appreciably the already very large number of perfectforesight equilibria which typically emerges in monetary economies with infinitely many agents and commodities. In one fairly extended example (Sections II and III), self-fulfilling prophecies comprise between one third and one-half of all equilibria. Some of these resemble permanent "recessions" or "booms" and all of them are replicating Markov chains, that is, perpetual cycles ignited by expectations alone.
Phenomena of this sort will persist if an intrinsically valuable asset like land replaces fiat money as store of value, but may unravel if we set up markets for claims contingent on prophecies-whether they do unravel is an interesting topic for future research. As a practical matter, however, one ought to recognize that a vast number of financial markets would be needed to neutralize all subjective factors that individuals might consider influential in economic life.
Given some market incompleteness, what can be said in general about the solutions to Eq. (7)? In particular, under what conditions will extraneous uncertainty replicate itself in perpetuity (as it does in the example of Section II), vanish in finite time (as in Eq. (21)) or dissolve asymptotically?
These questions are outside the scope of the paper at hand but appear to be ones that we must face if we wish to characterize intelligently the myriad of equilibria which are consistent with the postulate of rational expectations. " 
